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CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF TAXABLE INCOME
CHARLES L. B. LOWNDES*
Now that fifty years have passed since the adoption of the
sixteenth amendment and the enactment of the first income tax
under that amendment, it is an appropriate time to consider what
progress we have made in the solution of a basic problem under the
tax: what is taxable as income?
The complete answer to this question will not be found in the
Code, which makes no attempt to lay down a general definition of
taxable income in the sense of what is taxable as income.- Section
61 (a) of the 1954 Code declares: "Except as otherwise provided in
this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source
derived, including but not limited to the following items:
Although section 61(a) and its predecessor, section 2 2(a) of the
1939 Code, are frequently referred to as a legislative attempt to
define taxable income, it is obvious that a definition of income in
terms of itself would not be particularly revealing. Actually, of
course, section 61(a) does not attempt to define taxable income,
but simply indicates one of the steps in computing the income tax.
Gross income in the statutory sense is the amount of income which
furnishes the starting point for the computation of the income tax,
after subtracting exclusions from gross income from gross receipts.
Although the statute does not contain any general definition of tax-
able income, it does list a number of specific items which are
included in2 or excluded from 3 gross income, and to this extent it
indicates what is and what is not taxed under the income tax in
most of the more common situations. The definition of what is
taxable as income in the situations not specifically covered by the
statute, however, is left to the Treasury and the courts.
* James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University.
1 "Taxable income" is used in this discussion in the sense of the income that
may be taxed under an income tax rather than in the sense of net income, the mean-
ing given to the expression "taxable income" under § 63 of the 1954 Code.
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 61, 71-78.
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 101-119.
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At one'time the Supreme Court attempted to construct a gen-
eral definition of taxable income.4 However, it soon abandoned this
effort 5 in favor of an ad hoc approach under which the existence of
taxable income must be found in the particular circumstances of
the specific case.6 Beyond paraphrasing the statutory definition of
gross income, the Treasury Regulations do not attempt any general
definition of taxable income. This does not mean, however, that
there are no guidelines as to what constitutes taxable income. Al-
though there is no single authoritative definition of taxable income,
the general pattern of the cases reveals the judicial attitude toward
the income tax and affords a surer clue to what may be taxed as
income than any formal definition. Although the Supreme Court
cases are not the only reflection of the judicial attitude, they are
typical, and in the limited space available here must be our prin-
cipal reliance.
The key to what the Supreme Court currently conceives to be
taxable income lies in the radical reversal of its attitude toward the
income tax. This hostility, which first expressed itself in the Pollock
case,7 where the Court struck down the 1894 tax, carried over after
the sixteenth amendment." By construing the amendment narrowly
and attempting to set up a constitutional definition of income to
which Congress had to conform,9 the Court sought to control the
tax which it had striven unsuccessfully to outlaw entirely. As time
passed, however, and the Court became reconciled to the tax, its
attitude changed."0 Today the Court's tolerance of the tax has
reached the point where it would be very surprising if anything
which there was a reasonable basis for taxing under the income tax
was found to be beyond Congress' constitutional competence.:1 As
4 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
5 In Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931), Mr. Justice
Holmes declared that there was "nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial
definitions" of income.
6 In Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 407 (1946), the Court said: "In
fact, no single, conclusive criterion has been found to determine in all situations what
is a sufficient gain to support the imposition of an income tax. No more can be said
in general than that all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered."
7 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
8 See, for example, Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber,
supra note 4; Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
9 Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 4.
10 See, for example, Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933); Helvering v. Bruun,
309 U.S. 461 (1940) ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
11 Compare the Court's attitude toward the constitutionality of subjecting stock
dividends to the income tax in Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 4, and in Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
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far as construction is concerned, the Court's conception of taxable
income has grown correspondingly generous and flexible.12
In connection with the Supreme Court's present posture with
regard to the income tax, there is a pertinent parallel in the reversal
of its attitude toward the estate tax. Originally, the Court was
inimical toward the estate tax. Although it never went to the ex-
treme of holding the estate tax unconstitutional, 13 as it did the
income tax, it did everything it could to hamper the effective ad-
ministration of the tax. The Justices strove to limit the application
of the tax by construing the statute in a way that not only ignored
the literal wording of the statute, 4 but also rejected the legislative
background behind the wording.' " When construction failed to
frustrate the tax, the Court struck down particular provisions by
inventing constitutional limitations which restricted the estate tax
to "testamentary transfers" "I and inhibited the retroactive applica-
tion of the tax to transfers effected before the provision taxing such
transfers was enacted. Later, however, when the Court became
reconciled to the estate tax the judicial climate changed dramat-
ically. The Court proceeded to demolish ,the constitutional barriers
it had erected against the tax, and held that any kind of transfer
was taxable constitutionally under the tax as long as there was a
rational basis for taxing it.' Moreover, it construed the statute
generously, stretching the statutory language as far in favor of the
12 James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Commissioner v. LoBue, 351
U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Gen-
eral American Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955).
'3 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) upheld the constitutionality of a fed-
eral inheritance tax. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) sustained
the federal estate tax.
14 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Shukert v. Allen,
273 U.S. 545 (1927).
15 In May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930) the Supreme Court held that a trans-
fer with a reservation of a life interest was not taxable as a transfer "intended to
take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after" death, despite the fact that
Congress borrowed this phrase from state inheritance taxes, where it was con-
strued uniformly to include such transfers. Other examples of the Court's attempt
to limit the estate tax by hostile construction include: Helvering v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935); Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S.
48; and White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
16 Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
17 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
18 Helvering v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935) and Helver-
ing v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1937) repudiated the idea than only "testamentary trans-
fers" may be taxed under the estate tax. Although Jacobs v. United States, 306 U.S.
363 (1939) did not directly overrule Nichols v. Coolidge, supra note 17, it came very
close to it as far as the results of the cases are concerned.
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government 19 as it had formerly compressed it in favor of the tax-
payer.
Of course, the change in the Supreme Court's attitude toward
the estate and income taxes was not accidental and unpremeditated.
It seems obvious that the Justices were not so enamored with their
own legal logic that they really felt they were inexorably bound to
hold that the income tax as applied to income from property was a
direct tax which was unconstitutional because it was not appor-
tioned, or that only testamentary transfers could be taxed under
the estate tax. The thing which excited their antagonism against
the income and estate taxes was the social philosophy behind the
taxes-the progressive feature of the taxes, with the consequent
emphasis on "soaking the rich" or taxing the taxpayer according to
his ability to pay-whichever way one chooses to phrase it. As the
"rugged individualism" of the Court became muted in the crescendo
of social innovation which characterized political developments in
this country after World War I, the Supreme Court's attitude
changed along with that of most of the citizenry and their political
leaders. The Court recognized progressive taxes as a permanent
feature of the fiscal scene and decided to accommodate itself to
them by giving full freedom to the legislature to formulate its own
fiscal patterns.
There has been a curious reversal in Congress' attitude in con-
nection with the estate and income taxes, which has paralleled the
change in the Court's attitude, except that it has gone in the op-
posite direction. As the Supreme Court has become increasingly
liberal about taxing income and estates, Congress has grown
increasingly conservative. This trend is clearly perceptible in
connection both with the estate tax2° and the income tax.2 ' Conse-
19 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940) overruled the St. Louis Union
Trust Co. cases, supra note 15, and Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701
(1949) pushed the Hallock case so far that Congress repudiated the Spiegel case in
the Technical Changes Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 891 (1949). Nearly twenty years after
the decision in May v. Heiner, supra note 15, and the amendment of the statute to
tax transfers with a reservation of a life estate explicitly, the Supreme Court sud-
denly overruled May v. Heiner in Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632
(1949), inspiring Congress to reject the Church case. Technical Changes Act of
1949, supra. See also Commissioner v. Holmes' Estate, 326 U.S. 480 (1946) and
Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
20 See, for example, Congress' rejection of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner and Commissioner v. Church's Estate, supra note
19; the marital deduction (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056) ; and the abolition of the
premium payment test for taxing life insurance to the estate of the insured. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
21 To cite but a few examples: when the Supreme Court held in Helvering v.
Bruun, supra note 10, that a lessor realized income from improvements made to the
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quently, as the Court has extended the definition of taxable income,
Congress has tended to contract it.
The real definition of taxable income is not found in formal
definitions, but in the attitude of Congress and the courts toward
what is, and what may be, taxed under the income tax. It is time
to document these generalities with specifics.
Source of Income
An interesting illustration of how the Supreme Court's attitude
changed toward the income tax is found in its treatment of the
constitutional barriers to taxing income because of the source of the
income. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan c Trust Co. 22 the Court dis-
covered two constitutional objections to the 1894 income tax. The
first was -that as applied to income from property, the tax was in
substance a tax on the source of the income, and a direct tax on
property which was unconstitutional because it was not appor-
tioned. The second fatal defect of the tax was that as applied to
interest from state and local bonds it imposed an unconstitutional
burden on the borrowing power of the states. As far as the literal
language of the sixteenth amendment is concerned, it meets both
of the objections advanced in the Pollock case. The amendment
provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration." This would appear to empower Congress to impose
an unapportioned income tax and to tax income regardless of the
source of the income. Shortly after the amendment was adopted,
however, the question arose in Peck & Co. v. Lowe.23 as to whether
the federal income tax could be applied constitutionally to the in-
come of an exporter or whether it was a prohibited tax on exports.
leased premises by the lessee when the lease terminated, Congress explicitly excluded
such income from the income tax. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 109. The taxation of
employee stock options by the Supreme Court [Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S.
243 (1956) and Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945)] has been accompanied
by the legislative evolution of the restricted stock option exempting such income
from the income tax in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 421. After the Supreme Court held
that an unharvested crop was not a capital asset which resulted in a capital gain
when sold in conjunction with the land on which it was grown [Watson v. Com-
missioner, 345 U.S. 544 (1953)] Congress nullified this decision by providing that
such gains should be taxed as capital gains by enacting Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 1231. Section 108 of the 1954 Code provides for the exclusion from gross income
of gain from the cancellation of a debt, which was held to be taxable as income in
Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, supra note 5, and Commissioner v. Jacobson,
336 U.S. 28 (1949).
22 Supra note 7.
23 247 U. S. 165 (1918).
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Passing over the comma between "from whatever source derived"
and "without apportionment among the several states," the Su-
preme Court declared that the amendment simply relieved Con-
gress from the obligation of apportioning an income tax because of
the source of the income -taxed. It did not confer any substantive
power on Congress to tax income from sources that it could not
reach before the adoption of the amendment. The Court thus went
out of its way to construe the amendment as narrowly as possible,
since it finally held that the tax in Peck & Co. v. Lowe upon income
from exporting was too far removed from the source of the income
to be a tax upon exports. Consequently, the digression about
whether Congress had power under the sixteenth amendment to tax
income irrespectively of the source of the income had no direct bear-
ing upon the ultimate disposition of the case.
By refusing to construe the sixteenth amendment to authorize
Congress to tax income regardless of the source of the income, the
Court laid the foundation for the later holding that the federal
income tax as applied to the salary of a federal judge appointed
before the enactment of the tax was unconstitutional, because it
violated the prohibition against reducing judges' stipends during
their term of office.24 The Court also held ,that it was unconstitu-
tional to impose the federal income tax on compensation of state
officers and employees. 25
As soon as it completed the carpentry on these constitutional
obstacles, the Court proceeded to demolish them. The exemption
of compensation of state officers and employees had already en-
countered doctrinal difficulties due to judicial attempts to limit the
immunity to state officers and employees, as distinguished from in-
dependent contractors, 26 and to confine it to officers and em-
ployees engaged in performing essential governmental functions for
a state.27 The distinctions between an independent contractor and
an officer and employee, and between proprietary and governmental
24 Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920). In Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501
(1925) the Supreme Court held that income of a judge appointed after the enactment
of the federal income tax could not be subjected to the tax, because this would make
his compensation uncertain and the constitutional guaranty against reducing a judge's
stipend implied a certain stipend.
25 Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352 (1937).
26 Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926). It was not easy to dis-
tinguish between an independent contractor and an officer or employee of a state.
Compare Register v. Commissioner, 69 F2d 607 (5th Cir. 1934) with Burnet v.
Livezoy, 48 F2d 59 (4th Cir. 1931), involving attorneys employed by a state, and
Underwood v. Commissioner, 56 F. 2d 67 (4th Cir. 1932) with Halsey v. Helvering,
57 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1934) involving engineers employed by a state.
27 Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1935).
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functions of a state became so blurred that it was impossible to
predict the result in a borderline case. At the height of this con-
fusion the Supreme Court came to the rescue by discarding the
immunity entirely and holding that there was no constitutional
prohibition against subjecting the salary of a state officer or em-
ployee to the federal income tax, since the tax did not impinge
directly upon the governmental employer and there was no way of
showing that the burden of the tax was shifted to the governmental
employer.28 Shortly afterwards, it was held that there is no consti-
tutional inhibition against taxing salaries of federal judges under
the income tax.29 The Court adopted the position of Mr. Justice
Holmes who, dissenting in Evans v. Gore,30 had pointed out that
the purpose of the constitutional provision against reducing judicial
stipends was to assure independence of the judiciary against the
legislature, and there was no chance that this independence would
be infringed by a general income tax.
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly abandoned
the position it took in Peck & Co. v. Lowe,3' when it asserted that
the sixteenth amendment did not confer power on Congress to tax
income from sources which it could not reach before the amend-
ment, it is clear that the attitude of the Court has relaxed consid-
erably since that decision. Apparently Congress does have power
to tax income "from whatever source derived." The only situation
where doubt remains about congressional power to tax income
because of the source of the income is in connection with a federal
income tax on interest from state bonds. There is no conclusive
authority as to the constitutionality of such a tax. The only case
where the Supreme Court squarely held that Congress lacked power
to tax interest from state and local bonds was the Pollock case,32
which was, of course, decided before the sixteenth amendment.
The modern federal income taxes have all carried an explicit
exemption of interest from state and local bonds which has pre-
vented any question about the constitutionality of a tax upon such
interest from arising.33 In several cases the Supreme Court held that
provisions of the income tax which did not directly impinge on in-
terest from state bonds, although they indirectly affected such
28 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 293 U.S. 214 (1935).
29 O'Malley v. Woodbrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939). See Baker v. Commissioner,
149 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1945).
30 Supra note 24.
31 Supra note 23. But see the concurring opinion of Black, J., in Helvering v.
Gerhardt, supra note 28.
32 Supra note 7.
33 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 103(a) (1).
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interest or a gain from the sale of the bonds, were constitutional. 3
The care which the Court took to distinguish these cases from a tax
upon interest from state bonds might indicate a belief that such a
tax would be unconstitutional. Helvering v. Gerhardt,35 which held
that the federal income tax could be applied constitutionally to sal-
aries of state employees is not directly in point, because that de-
cision was grounded upon the proposition that it could not be
demonstrated that the burden of such a tax would be shifted to the
governmental employer. There is a considerable accumulation of
economic data to the effect that subjecting interest from state and
local bonds to the federal income tax would require the states and
local units to pay higher interest on their obligations. The case
closest in point is Alabama v. King & Boozer,36 where the Supreme
Court held that a state sales tax could be applied constitutionally to
sales to a contractor engaged in building an army camp for the fed-
eral government under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. The Court
said that since the legal incidence of the tax was on the contractor,
the fact that the burden of the tax might be shifted to the govern-
mental employer was immaterial. The rationale of this decision
would clearly sustain the constitutionality of a federal income tax
on the interest from a state bond. The tax is formally imposed not
upon the governmental borrower, but upon the individual bond-
holder, and if the ultimate economic incidence of the tax is imma-
terial, the tax is clearly constitutional. Of course, King & Boozer
involved a sales tax, not an income tax. It would require no great
judicial agility for the Supreme Court to distinguish the case from
that of an income tax. Here is where the attitude of the Court
becomes important. It is practically inconceivable that the present
Court, with its friendly tolerance of the income tax and its cog-
nizance of federal fiscal needs, would hold that taxing interest from
state bonds under the federal income tax was unconstitutional.
Definition of Taxable Income
At approximately the same time that the Supreme Court was
seeking to keep some measure of control over the income tax by
construing the sixteenth amendment in a way that gave the Court
the final say about what sources of income might be taxed, it took
further steps to secure control of the tax by laying down a definition
34 Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) (tax on gain from sale of state bonds) ;
Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 (1931) (denial of deduction for interest incurred
on loan to purchase state bonds) ; Flint v. Stone Tracey Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911)
(federal excise on corporations measured by interest from state bonds).
35 Supra note 28.
36 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
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of taxable income. In Eisner v. Macomber ' the Court held that
the 1916 act, which explicitly taxed stock dividends as income, was
unconstitutional as applied to a dividend of common on common,
since the stockholder had not realized any income from the divi-
dend. Although Eisner v. Macomber never lived up to its pros-
pective potential, it was a subtle and far-reaching decision. By
laying down a constitutional definition of income, the Court cre-
ated the impression that only income in the sense in which the
term was used in the sixteenth amendment could be reached under
the federal income tax. Furthermore, by specifying three essential
ingredients of income in the constitutional sense, it limited the
items taxable as income under the federal income tax to those
possessing the three magic ingredients.
It seems clear, however, that the federal income tax might be
applied constitutionally to a gain which is not income in the sense
in which that term is employed in the sixteenth amendment. Con-
gress does not derive its power to tax from the sixteenth amend-
ment. It had plenary power to tax anything before the amendment
was adopted. The Supreme Court did not question the power of
Congress to tax income or any other gain in the Pollock case. s
The Pollock case held that the 1894 income tax was unconstitu-
tional as far as the tax applied to the income from property, not
because it was a tax which Congress lacked power to impose, but
because in substance it was a tax upon the property which pro-
duced the income, and was a direct tax which had to be appor-
tioned. The sixteenth amendment simply relieves Congress from
the necessity of apportioning an income tax which is regarded as
a direct tax. It does not in any way circumscribe congressional
power to tax income from some source other than property (such
as compensation for services) where the tax would not be a direct
tax. Nor does it prevent Congress from taxing a gain which is not
income (if there be such a gain) in the constitutional sense, pro-
vided that the tax is not a direct tax.39 The opinion in Eisner v.
Macomber, consciously or unconsciously, tended to obscure this.
For example, in Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co.,40 the Supreme Court
held that subsidies paid to the Cuba Railroad by the Cuban gov-
ernment in return for building a railroad in Cuba were not taxable
as income of the railroad, but constituted a contribution to capital.
After reaching this conclusion, the Court added that the subsidies
did not constitute "income within the meaning of the sixteenth
37 Supra note 4.
38 Supra note 7.
39 Spredes Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904).
40 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
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amendment." 41 Apparently the impression which Mr. Justice But-
ler sought to convey by this cryptic comment was that any attempt
to tax the subsidies under the income tax would be unconstitu-
tional. It is difficult to see why this should be so. Even con-
ceding that a contribution to capital is not income in the con-
stitutional sense, a tax upon an accession of this kind would appear
to be an indirect tax upon the transfer of the contribution to capital
to the recipient of the transfer. It is difficult to see any basis for
holding that it is a direct tax.42 If the tax is not a direct tax, the
only possible objection to taxing a contribution to capital under
the income tax (since presumably constitutionality involves some-
thing more fundamental than a quibble about labels) would be
that this involves some sort of unreasonable classification that
offends due process. It seems plain, however, that if a contribu-
tion to capital is not income, it is a kind of gain that approaches
income closely enough to be reasonably taxable under an income
tax. The recent difficulties which the courts have encountered in
determining what constitutes a contribution to capital are ample
evidence of this. 43 Of course, the current code excludes contribu-
tions to the capital of a corporation from gross income. Despite
Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co., however, it does not appear that this
exclusion is compelled by constitutional considerations.
Although there is considerable confusion in the cases, it would
appear that the only time it is necessary to resort to the sixteenth
amendment to justify taxing a gain under the federal income tax
is when the tax on the gain is regarded as a direct tax, which must
be apportioned unless it can be brought under the sixteenth amend-
ment. The sixteenth amendment does not, as Edwards v. Cuba
R.R. Co.44 intimated, limit the federal income tax to gains which
constitute income in the sense in which that term is used in the
amendment. It is true that section 61(a) of the 1954 Code defines
gross income as "all income from whatever source derived," and
presumably limits the tax to income in the sense in which that
term is employed in the sixteenth amendment. Moreover, the
earlier laws which defined gross income as "gains or profits and
41 Id. at 633.
42 There is an obvious analogy between such a tax and the taxes on testamentary
and inter vivos transfers of capital which were held to be indirect taxes in Knowlton
v. Moore and New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, supra note 13, and Bromley v. Mc-
Caughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
43 Teleservice Co. v. Commissioner, 254 F2d 105 (3d Cir. 1958).
44 Supra note 40.
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income derived from any source whatever" also limited the tax to
income in the constitutional sense, since both Congress and the
Supreme Court have indicated that "gains or profits" were syn-
onymous with "income" and added nothing to that description.4
5
The fact that only income is taxed under the general statutory
definition of gross income does not mean, of course, that it would
not be constitutionally possible to tax a gain which is not income
under the income tax. Nor, for that matter, would it necessarily
prevent taxing an item specifically mentioned by the statute, since
presumably the specific designation would control the more gen-
eral description. Where, for example, the Internal Revenue Code
or some ancillary legislation specifies in connection with a statute
regulating prices that overceiling prices paid for goods sold by a
taxpayer shall not be deductible in computing his taxable gain from
the sales, the deduction of the overceiling prices should be dis-
allowed, despite the fact that one may feel that the gain from the
sales without this deduction does not meet the general description
of income.46 Moreover, it would appear that disallowance of the
deduction would be fully constitutional if the tax on the gross
proceeds of the sales could be fairly regarded as an indirect tax
on the sales rather than a direct tax which requires apportionment,
45 This was indicated in the Committee Reports accompanying the 1954 Code
where it was stated that "income" in § 61(a) of the 1954 Code had the same
meaning as "gains or profits and income" in § 22(a) of the 1939 Code. H.R.
Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A18; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168.
For the Supreme Court's position see the discussion of Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., supra note 12, at p. 166 infra.
46 In the absence of a statutory provision forbidding the deduction of overceiling
prices in computing the cost of goods sold, it has been held that this cannot be
required, since the statute taxes net income. Commissioner v. Guminski, 198 F2d 265
(5th Cir. 1952) ; Jones v. Herber, 198 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1952); Hofferbert v. An-
derson Oldsmobile, Inc., 197 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Commissioner v. Weisman, 197
F2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948). The Sullenger case
suggested that it would be unconstitutional to deny the deduction of the overceiling
prices, a proposition questioned by Magruder, J., in his concurring opinion in the
Weisnan case. Magruder suggested that a tax on a merchant's gross receipts would
be an indirect tax under Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, supra note 39,
which would be constitutional as an indirect tax not requiring apportionment apart
from the sixteenth amendment. A statute forbidding the deduction of overceiling
wage payments in computing the cost of goods sold for income tax purposes has
been held constitutional. Solon Decorating Co. v. Commissioner, 253 F2d 424 (6th
Cir. 1958); Pedone v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 288 (Ct. Cl. 1957); N. A.
Woodworth Co. v. Kavanaugh, 102 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 154
(6th Cir. 1953); Weather-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 376 (6th Cir.
1952).
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regardless of whether or not the tax was a tax upon income in the
sense in which that term is used in the sixteenth amendment. 7
Although the Supreme Court soon abandoned any attempt to
lay down a general constitutional definition of taxable income, the
erroneous impression persisted after Eisner v. Macomber,4 and
probably still lingers in some minds, that only income in the sense
in which that term is used under the sixteenth amendment may
be taxed constitutionally under the income tax.49 Moreover, for
many years the courts struggled with the three specific requisites
for taxable income that were laid down in Eisner v. Macoamber.
That case defined income "as the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined." The three essential ingredients of
income prescribed by that decision were, therefore: (1) a gain,
(2) derived or realized, (3) from capital or labor or both combined.
Perhaps the most accurate index of the changed attitude of the
Supreme Court toward the income tax lies in the extent to which
it has been willing to dispense with -these elements in finding tax-
able income.
Gain
The only element of income prescribed by Eisner v. Macomber
that still appears to be required is gain. Gain persists as an essen-
tial element of taxable income, but it is an attenuated gain, gain
in a special Pickwickian tax sense.
The gain which will sustain an income tax may take any form
from which the taxpayer can derive an economic, or perhaps even
an emotional satisfaction. Income may be realized in kind as well
as cash. Thus accommodations furnished an employee for the
convenience of the employee constitute income to the employee.5 0
47 See the concurring opinion of Magruder, J., in Commissioner v. Weisman,
supra note 46, and Spreckles Mfg. Co. v. McClain, mipra note 39. See also Nicol
v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899). In upholding the application of the federal income tax
to gross income of a mutual insurance company without regard to underwriting
losses, the Third Circuit said: "It is not necessary to uphold the validity of the
tax imposed by the United States that the tax itself be an accurate label ...
It could well be argued that the tax involved here is an 'excise tax' based upon
the receipt of money by the taxpayer. It certainly is not a tax on property and
it certainly is not a capitation tax; therefore, it need not be apportioned ...
Congress has power to impose taxes generally, and if the particular imposition does
not run afoul of any constitutional restrictions then the tax is lawful, call it what
you will." Penn Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F2d 16 (3d Cir. 1960).
48 Supra note 4.
49 See, for example, Lela Sullenger and the dissenting opinion in Pedone v.
United States, supra note 46.
50 Dean v. Commissioner, 187 F2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951). See Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 119.
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Income may take the form of -the discharge of a liability as well as
the receipt of an asset.51 One of the most interesting kinds of
gain which has been held to constitute income is the cancellation
of a debt for less than the amount of the debt.5
2
Gain is required for taxable income, but the gain need not be
the gain of the taxpayer who is taxed upon the gain if there is some
justifiable reason for taxing him upon it. Thus, apart from explicit
statutory provision, the Supreme Court has held that compensation
for personal services is taxable to the person who renders the
services, 53 even though he irrevocably divests himself of any legal
right to the compensation. 4 The income from a partnership may
be taxed to the partner who actually produces the income, although
someone else is legally entitled to it."' Income from property is
taxable to the person who owns the property, even though he
assigns the right to the income,56 as long as he does not transfer
the property or the estate which produces the income.57
A statute taxing the income from a revocable trust to the
grantor of the trust, although the income was paid to one other
than the grantor, was held to be constitutional by the Supreme
Court on the ground that a person who controls the disposition of
income may properly be taxed as the owner of the income.5 8 The
basic notion behind this decision was extended still further by a
lower court which held that the income from a revocable trust was
taxable to the grantor of the trust apart from any statute imposing
such a tax on the ground that, due to the control exercised over
the income by the grantor, it really was his income.5 9 Even before
Congress explicitly taxed the income from short-term trusts to
the grantor of the trust, the Supreme Court held in Helvering v.
Clifford60 that the income from such a trust was taxable to the
51 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
52 Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, supra note 5.
53 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
54 Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940). In a recent tax court case,
however, the Tax Court held, with seven judges dissenting, that a person is not
taxable upon a prize won in a contest, when he is not entitled to receive the prize
but is required to designate another to do so. Paul A. Teschner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1963).
But sce Rev. Rul. 58-127, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 42.
55 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949) ; Lusthaus v. Commissioner,
327 U.S. 293 (1946); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946). See Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 704(e).
56 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940).
57 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
58 Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
59 McCauley v. Commissioner, 44 F2d 919 (5th Cir. 1930).
00 Supra note 56.
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grantor of the trust as the substantial owner of the trust property.
This idea was subsequently extended by the lower courts to apply
to a trust where the grantor retained no reversionary interest in
the trust property, but had power to designate the beneficiaries of
the trust,"' on the theory that the incidents of ownership repre-
sented by the power to change the beneficial enjoyment of the
trust property was enough to justify treating the grantor as the
owner of the trust income. The lower courts62 (and, of course,
later the statute63) have extended Helvering v. Clifford to tax the
income of a trust to one other than the grantor of the trust, as
the substantial owner of the trust property, where this person
possesses power to call for the income or corpus of the trust. Per-
haps the most extreme case of all, from the view point of taxing
income to one person which belongs legally to another is Burnet v.
Wells,6 4 where at a relatively early date Mr. Justice Cardozo
speaking in behalf of the majority of the Supreme Court held that
it was constitutional to tax the income from a trust, which could
be used to pay the insurance premiums of life insurance policies on
the life of the grantor of the trust, to the grantor of the trust.
Since the trust was irrevocable, there was no basis for arguing that
the trust income should be taxed to the settlor of the trust because
of his control over the trust income. Nor, since the settlor was not
under a legal obligation to provide life insurance for the benefi-
ciaries of the policies, could the Court invoke the doctrine that it
was to invoke in Douglas v. Willcuts 65 several years later that
the income was really the income of the grantor of the trust, because
it was used to discharge his obligation. Instead, the Court rea-
soned that since the grantor of the trust had dedicated the income
from the trust to keeping up his insurance, he received a continuing
benefit that made it reasonable to tax the income from the trust
to him. The basic approach to taxable income in Butrnet v. Wells
is a due process approach. Since Congress did not play the des-
pot in taxing the income from the trust to the grantor of the
trust, the tax was constitutional. Although Burnet v. Wells is an
old case according to tax chronology, it perhaps comes closest of
any decision to approximating the Supreme Court's present posi-
61 Ingle v. McGowan, 189 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. Buck,
120 F2d 775 (2d Cir. 1941).
62 Grant v. Commissioner, 174 F2d 891 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Commissioner v. New-
man, 159 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945), Cf., however, Funk v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d
127 (3d Cir. 1950).
63 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 678.
61 289 U.S. 670 (1933).
65 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
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tion on taxable income. Any gain may be taxed as income under
the income tax if this is a reasonable thing to do.
There are several other interesting situations where a taxpayer
is taxed upon a gain although he himself has no gain. For ex-
ample, corporate distributions are taxed as dividends to the stock-
holders who receive them to the extent that the corporation has
current earnings or earnings and profits accumulated after Febru-
ary 28, 1913. It is possible under this rule (which looks for gain
to the corporation which distributes a dividend, rather than to the
stockholder to whom it is taxed as income) to have a taxable
dividend where the stockholder has no gain. For example, sup-
pose that A purchased a share of stock in X corporation for $200,
which represented $100 capital and $100 earnings accumulated
after February 28, 1913. The next day the corporation declares
and distributes $100 to A as a dividend and this distribution re-
duces the value of A's stock to $100. Although A has no actual
gain, but simply a return of part of his capital, he has taxable
income of $100.6 A somewhat similar situation exists where a
man gives away property which has appreciated while it is in his
hands and the property is promptly sold by the donee. In this
case the donee is taxed upon the gain, since he is required to use
as his basis the substituted basis of the donor, rather than the fair
market value of the property at the time he acquired it, although
the property may not have increased in value after he received it.67
The cases we have just been considering taxed a taxpayer
upon a gain which belonged to someone else. There was, however,
a gain. There are several cases where a taxpayer has been taxed
upon income, where there actually was no gain, on the basis of a
presumption or a legal fiction.
In Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co.,"" a mortgagee bid
in the mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale for the principal
amount of the mortgage debt plus accrued interest. Although the
fair market value of the property was worth less than the principal
amount of the mortgage debt, the Supreme Court held that the
mortgagee realized income to the extent of the interest obligations
applied to acquire the property. The Court based its decision upon
the presumption that the property was worth at least the amount
GO In United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 172 (1921), the Supreme Court
rationalized the result on the theory that the taxpayer "simply stepped into the
shoes ... of the stockholder whose shares he acquired, and presumably the prospect
of a dividend influenced the price paid, and was discounted by the prospect of an
income tax to be paid thereon."
67 Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1928).
68 300 U.S. 216 (1937).
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bid for it, and buttressed this argument with the reflection that the
taxpayer had realized income from the interest obligation because
he had used the obligation to step up the bid price, so that the
mortgagor could not redeem the property for less than the principal
of the debt and accrued interest.
In Johnson v. Helvering69 a trustee sold unproductive prop-
erty at a loss and distributed part of the proceeds of the sale to the
income beneficiary as delayed income. The court held that the
income beneficiary had realized taxable income from the trust,
although the trust had a loss, upon ,the theory that the beneficiary
and the trust were distinct, and the distribution in the hands of
the beneficiary represented income to the beneficiary, regardless of
any loss to the trust. The tax imposed in this case obviously con-
tradicts the conduit theory of taxing trusts, and is no longer
imposed under the provisions of the 1954 Code.70
Another situation where the gain which will support the
imposition of an income tax is a nebulous sort of gain involves
the so-called claim of right doctrine. In United States v. Lewis,71
for example, the Supreme Court held that money paid to a tax-
payer under a mistake was taxable to the taxpayer, if he honestly
believed he was entitled to it, even though he later had to return
the money. Instead of taking a transactional approach and hold-
ing that the later return of the money wiped out any income
from the receipt of the money, the Court declared that each
taxable period must be viewed separately and the taxpayer, there-
fore, realized income when he received the money and incurred a
loss when he returned it.
72
The claim of right theory has been applied, with dubious
propriety, to prevent an accrual basis taxpayer's deferring prepaid
income until it is actually earned. In Commissioner v. Wilcox,7
the Supreme Court turned the claim of right theory around to hold
than an embezzler did not realize income from the proceeds of an
embezzlement, because he had not acquired them under a claim
of right. The reasoning of the Wilcox case was repudiated.in Rut-
kin v. United States,75 which held that an extortioner was taxable
under the income tax upon the proceeds of the extortion. In James
69 141 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1944). See McCullough v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d
345 (2d Cir. 1946).
70 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 652, 662.
71 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
72 The rule in the Lewis case, supra note 71, was modified by § 1341 of the 1954
Code.
73 See Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
74 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
75 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
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v. United States,76 the Supreme Court rejected the result in the
Wilcox case and held that the proceeds of an embezzlement are
taxable as income to the embezzler. In these cases the Court
found that there was a sufficient gain in the dominion which the
taxpayers had over the wrongfully acquired property to constitute
taxable income, despite the absence of a claim of right. Appar-
ently this dominion must be coupled with an evil mind. Money
which a man borrows is not income to the borrower, despite the
control he possesses over the money, presumably because he in-
tends to return it and it is lawfully acquired.
Consideration
After Eisner v. Macomber 77 declared that income was a "gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined," it was
assumed that taxable income required consideration, and a wholly
gratuitous receipt could not be taxed as income. This impression
was strengthened by the fact that all of the federal income taxes
since the sixteenth amendment have explicitly excluded gifts and
bequests from gross income .7
It was never particularly clear why a gratuitous receipt should
not be taxed as income. The ability of a taxpayer to pay a tax
due to a receipt is in no wise affected by its gratuitous character.
Indeed it is arguable that there is more justification for imposing
a tax upon a gratuitous receipt than there is in taxing something
which the taxpayer has to work for. It is true that gifts are apt
to be sporadic rather than recurrent, but recurrence has never been
deemed an essential characteristic of taxable income.
Regardless of the merits of a tax upon gratuitous receipts,
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. 79 makes it clear that con-
sideration is not an essential element of taxable income. In that
case the Supreme Court held that punitive damages are taxable as
income under the federal income tax.80 Unfortunately for the
commentator, the taxpayer conceded the constitutionality of the
tax, so that was not in issue. The Court declared that as a matter
of construction punitive damages fell within the 1939 Code defini-
76 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
77 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
78 For the exemption of gifts under the current law see Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 102. The 1894 income tax, which was held unconstitutional in the Pollock case,
supra note 7, taxed personal property acquired by gift or inheritance. Seidman,
Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws 1938-1861, 1017 (1938).
70 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
80 A holding which the Service extends to punitive damages in personal injury
actions where compensatory damages are not taxable. Rev. Rul. 54-418, 1958-2
Cum. Bull. 18.
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tion of gross income taxing "gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever." The Court reasoned that the statutory
language embraces all gains except those exempted by the statute.
The only exemption that seemed even faintly relevant in the case
of punitive damages was the exclusion for gifts, and the Court
pointed out that it could not be seriously contended that punitive
damages were a gift. As Mr. Justice Black summed up the holding
in the Glenshaw case in Commissioner v. LoBue,81 "in defining
gross income as broadly as it did in section 22(a) Congress in-
tended to tax all gains except those specifically exempted."
It is possible to argue (although not very plausibly) that the
Glenshaw case does not hold that a gratuitous receipt constitutes
income. The argument would run something like this: in the
Glenshaw case the Supreme Court did not say that punitive dam-
ages are income in the constitutional sense, because the constitu-
tionality of the tax was conceded. The only question before the
Court was whether punitive damages were taxed under section
22(a) of the 1939 Code, which imposed a tax on "gains or profits
and income." The Court held that as a matter of constructionpunitive damages were a "gain" which was taxed under the statute,
because they constitute a gain and they are not excluded from the
tax imposed by the statute. There was no need to consider whether
punitive damages are income in the constitutional sense, because
this was not in issue. Moreover, even if punitive damages are not
income in the constitutional sense, they are a gain which can be
taxed constitutionally, because such a tax would not be a direct
tax that requires apportionment.2
Although -the language in the Glenshaw case is not particularly
precise, it seems obvious that the Court thought that punitive
damages are taxable as income. This is apparent from the fact
that the Court quoted section 61(a) of the 1954 Code, which
defines gross income as "income from whatever source derived,"
without any reference to gains and profits, and noted that Congress
had declared that this was the same definition of gross income, as
far as meaning is concerned, as the definition in the 1939 Code. 3
The Court must have thought that "gain or profits" was simply
a synonym for "income" as far as the 1939 Code definition of gross
income was concerned, and that punitive damages fall within the
statutory concept of income. They certainly would not have cited
the 1954 Code definition of gross income and pointed out that
81 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
82 See Penn Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 47.
83 The Court quoted from the Committee Reports accompanying the 1954 Code,
supra note 45.
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Congress declared that it had simply re-enacted the 1939 definition,
unless they felt that punitive damages were taxable under the 1954
Code. Of course, this is a matter that has more than academic
significance. If "gains or profits" were not used as synonyms for
income under the 1939 Code, it would be possible to argue that
some of the things which were taxed under the 1939 Code cannot
be taxed under the more restrictive language of the 1954 Code.
It seems perfectly obvious, however, that the Supreme Court felt
in the Glenshaw case that earnings and profits were synonymous
with income and that taxable income includes any gain which is
not specifically exempted by the statute. If the Court had felt that
the change in the language effected by the 1954 code actually
altered the definition of gross income under that Code, it is incon-
ceivable that it would have cited the language of the 1954 Code
along with the congressional reports stating that there was no
change in meaning from the 1939 Code, without some dissenting
comment.
The Glenshaw case makes it clear that it is constitutional to
tax gratuitous receipts as income under the income tax. Although
no one seems to have entertained any serious doubts upon the
matter, this establishes the constitutionality of the tax imposed
by the 1954 Code on prizes and awards, even though the recipient
gave no consideration for the award . 4 It also eliminates any pos-
sible controversy over taxing fellowships above a stipulated
amount 85 and the constitutionality of the provision taxing sick
pay over and above the statutory exemption. 6
There has always been some confusion about what constitutes
a gift that is exempt from the income tax where donor and donee
stand in a business relation that makes it necessary to decide
whether a particular payment represents a gift or compensation for
services. This confusion was compounded when the Supreme Court
held in Commissioner v. Duberstein 7 and the companion cases 88
84 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 74. For a decision upholding the constitutionality
of this section, see Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1962). This,
of course, changes the law prior to the 1954 Code when it was held that lack of
consideration prevented a prize from being taxed as income. Glenn v. Bates, 217
F2d 535 (6th Cir. 1954); Campeau v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 370 (1955); Wash-
burn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
85 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 117.
86 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 105.
87 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
88 Kaiser v. United States, 363 U.S. 299 (1960) ; Stanton v. United States, 363
U.S. 278 (1960). For the subsequent history of the Stanton case, where it was
finally held that the payment was exempt as a gift, see Stanton v. United States, 186
F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aft'd, 287 F2d 876 (2d Cir. 1961).
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that the existence of a gift was a question of fact for the deter-
mination of the judge of the facts. The confusion created by the
Duberstein case has spilled over into payments by an employer to
the widow of a deceased employee and stirred up the uncertainty,
always latent in that area, as to when such payments are taxed and
when they represent a gift exempt from the income tax."9 Since
the Glenshazw 90 case makes it clear that there is no constitutional
prohibition against taxing gifts as income, Congress might well
intervene in these situations by providing that payments to widows
above a specified statutory amount shall be taxed as income, and
gratuitous payments between those standing in a business relation
shall be rebuttably presumed to be compensation for services rather
than a gift excluded from gross income.
The emphasis on constitutionality in -this discussion may have
created the impression that taxable income is purely a constitu-
tional question. Of course, it is not. In some cases it is necessary
to decide whether a particular gain is income in the constitutional
sense to justify the constitutionality of the tax upon that item. In
most cases, however, the question whether a particular gain is
taxable as income arises in the context of construction in the
course of a determination whether or not the federal income
tax taxes the item under the statutory description of income. In
this connection the new and expanded definition of income in the
Glenshaw case could be important, because the constitutionality
of the tax in that case was conceded and the Court's comment
that any gain which is not expressly excluded by the statute
is within the statutory definition of income was made with specific
reference to the construction of the statute. In view of the
Court's approach to taxable income in the Glenshaw case it
seems pertinent to re-examine some of the dubious exclusions from
gross income which have been made without any explicit statutory
sanction. The Service has ruled for example, that social security
benefits are not taxable as income,9' although they clearly are not
gifts, and it is difficult to fit them into any explicit statutory exclu-
sion. In much the same way, the exclusion of certain amounts paid
to a taxpayer to reimburse him for some non-deductible expense,
which have been excluded from gross income 92 without any stat-
89 Compare Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962) with Smith
v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1962) and Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F2d
290 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962).
90 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
91 I.T. 3194, 1938-1 Cum. Bull. 114; I.T. 3447, 1944-1 Cum. Bull. 191 (old age
and survivor's benefits) ; I.T. 3230, 1938-2 Cum. Bull. 136 (unemployment insurance);
Rev. Rul. 57-102, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 26 (public assistance to blind persons).
92 Rev. Rul. 57-60, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 25 (reimbursement of parent by school
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utory foundation for the exclusion, might be reconsidered. Of course,
the taxation of imputed income might conceivably be called into
question by the reasoning of the Glenshaw " case, since it is hard
to deny that a man realizes a gain from the use of his own property
and there appears to be no statutory provision for excluding such a
gain from gross income. Although it is unlikely that imputed in-
come will be taxed under the Glenshaw case, the exclusion of social
security payments and the reimbursement for personal expenses,
which were of dubious validity before the Glenshaw case, would
appear to be indefensible after that decision.
R ealization
The most interesting, and certainly the most controversial,
aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in Eisner v. Macomber 94
was the proposition that gain must be realized before it is trans-
muted into income in the constitutional sense. There has been
some confusion about realization because the term is used in
several senses.
Since the income tax is imposed on income for a particular
period it is necessary to have some standard for allocating income
to one period rather than another. This is done by the taxpayer's
system of accounting, and the resulting allocation is often described
as realization. Thus, for example, an accrual basis taxpayer is said
to realize income in the taxable period in which the right to the
income accrues. Realization in this sense does not deal with the
problem of the point at which gain is transmuted into income, but
with the taxable period to which an item, admittedly income, is
properly allocable. This was not, of course, the sense in which the
Supreme Court used realization in Eisner v. Macomber.
Before the question arises as to the proper taxable period to
which an item of income should be allocated, there is an anterior
problem of whether a gain has become sufficiently fixed and definite
to be treated as income and taxed under the income tax at all.
When gain reaches the point where it becomes taxable as income,
it is said to be realized. This is the sense in which the Supreme
Court spoke of realization in Eisner v. Macomber.
The real point in Eisner v. Macomber was not, however,
whether gain must be realized before it is taxed as income. Ad-
mittedly it must be. The real question in Eisner v. Macomber
board for transporting child to school when school bus not available); Rev. Rul.
54-249, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 53 (reimbursement of moving expenses of employee assigned
to new post by employer); Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 19 at 18
(reimbursement of job applicant's expenses in travelling for interview).
93 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra note 90.
94 Supra note 77.
1964]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
was who was finally to decide whether or not gain had reached the
point where it was proper to tax it as income. Of course, if in a
specific situation Congress does not decide this question, -the courts
must do so. When, for example, Congress said nothing about
whether stock dividends were taxable as income in the 1913 act,
the Supreme Court had to decide whether a stock dividend repre-
sented the kind of gain which it thought should be taxed under
the income taxY5 After Congress amended the law in 1916 ex-
plicitly to tax stock dividends as income, the question arose in
Eisner v. Macomber whether the legislative judgment that a
gain had reached the point where it might properly be taxed as
income was final, or whether the decisive judgment in this area
rested with the Supreme Court. In Eisner v. Macomber the Court
arrogated to itself the final determination as to when a gain may
properly be subjected to the income tax by treating this as a con-
stitutional question rather than a matter of administrative con-
venience. The Supreme Court has intimated that Eisner v. Macom-
ber was probably an error, and with the exception of an anomalous
early reorganization case,96 there does not seem to be any Supreme
Court decision which has held that a gain was not taxable under the
income tax because it had not been realized and was not income
in the constitutional sense. The retreat from the position taken
in Eisner v. Macomber has been obscured by the fact that realiza-
tion is an essential requisite for taxable income, although it is
probably not a constitutional requirement.
There is another common misunderstanding about Eisner v.
Macomber. The constitutional requirement of realization, if it ever
made any sense, did so only in connection with a tax on a gain
from property which could be regarded as a tax on the property
itself if it was not treated as a tax on income. In Eisner v.
Macomber, the Court said that the stock dividend could not be
taxed unless it was income in the sense of the sixteenth amendment,
because if the tax did not impinge upon income, then it was a direct
tax upon the property which produced the gain and was uncon-
stitutional because it was not apportioned. A tax upon a gain
which is not a direct tax upon property does not have to be sus-
tained under the sixteenth amendment.9 7 Consequently, even
upon the assumption that realization is a constitutional pre-
requisite of income, such a gain need not be realized to be constitu-
tionally taxable. There appears to have been some confusion on
this point even in high places. For example, in Helvering v. Inde-
95 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
96 Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
97 Supra note 47.
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pendent Life Insurance CoY5 Mr. Justice Butler declared: "The
rental value of the building used by the owner does not constitute
income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment." The
implication from this dictum is that a tax upon the rental value
would be unconstitutional, since the subject taxed would not be in-
come in the sense in which that term is used under the sixteenth
amendment. If, however, the tax upon the use of the building is an
indirect tax, in line with the Supreme Court's holdings with respect
to taxes on the use of property 9 and on a single incident of
property,100 it would appear to be fully constitutional, since it
would not have to be apportioned, and there would be no need
to inquire whether or not the benefit to the taxpayer constituted
income under the sixteenth amendment.
As long as there is an adequate gain to sustain an income tax,
it would seem that the question of when this gain should be taxed,
or when it was realized for tax purposes, should be a matter of
administrative convenience to be decided by Congress, rather than
a constitutional question whose ultimate resolution rests with the
courts. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has never explicitly
overruled the contrary position it took in Eisner v. Macomber, the
subsequent decisions of the Court appear to have abandoned the
contention in Eisner v. Macomber that realization is a constitu-
tional prerequisite of income.
Eisner v. Macomber defined a realized gain as a gain "severed
from" the property which produced it. It soon became clear,
however, that the severance was a legal fiction. Gain might be
realized not only when appreciated property was sold, but even when
it was exchanged and the gain and the capital which produced it
remained indissolubly wrapped up in a single asset received on the
exchange. Gain might also be realized when a debt was canceled
for less than the amount of the debt, although it was difficult to
see any severance of the gain from capital in this situation. In
Helvering v. Bruun,10' the Supreme Court made explicit what had
formerly been implied when it declared that realization does not
require actual severance of gain from the property that produced
it, but merely some event that freezes or fixes the gain with suffi-
cient certainty so that it is proper to tax it. Thus, in holding that
a lessor realized income from improvements made to the leased
98 292 U.S. 371, 379 (1934).
09 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 171 (1796).
100 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (inheritance tax); New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (estate tax) ; Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124
(1929) (gift tax).
101 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
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premises by the lessee upon ,the termination of the lease, the Court
declared: "While it is true that economic gain is not always taxable
as income, it is settled that the realization of gain need not be in
cash derived from the sale of an asset. Gain may occur as a result
of exchange of property, payment of the taxpayer's indebtedness,
relief from a liability, or other profit realized from the completion
of a transaction." 102 Although the Court may have implied that
there was some constitutional requirement of realization in Helver-
ing v. Bruun, in Helvering v. Horst,10 3 decided shortly after Helver-
ing v. Bruun, Mr. Justice Stone called realization a rule "founded
on administrative convenience."
The decline of realization as a constitutional requirement is
reflected in the area where the concept has had the greatest prac-
tical importance, that of corporate distributions.
The only case apart from Eisner v. Macomber in which realiza-
tion as a constitutional requisite has prevented the imposition of
an income tax was Weiss v. Stearn. 10 4 Before Congress amended
the statute to exempt corporate reorganizations there was a series
of five cases where, as a result of corporate reorganizations, stock-
holders received stock and securities in new corporations, whose
value substantially exceeded the basis of the stock and securities
in the old corporations. The Supreme Court was faced with the
problem of determining whether the excess was taxable as income.
Although there was no change in the substantial ownership of the
corporate enterprise on the part of the stockholders in any of these
cases, the Court held that they realized income in four of them 105
on the ground that they acquired a new or different interest in the
reorganized corporation. The distinction between the four cases
where the stockholders realized income and the single case 106 where
they did not was formal rather than substantial. Even at this stage
it was pretty obvious that the majority of the Supreme Court was
seeking some escape from Eisner v. Macomber-Macomber-the
single case that failed to distinguish Eisner v. Macomber was the
anomalous case.
With the exception of the early reorganization cases and
Helvering v. Bruun,107 where the Supreme Court held that a lessor
102 Id. at 469.
103 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940).
104 Supra note 96.
105 Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S.
134 (1923); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); United States v.
Phellis, supra note 66.
106 Weiss v. Stearn, supra note 96.
107 Supra note 101.
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realized income from improvements made to the leased premises
by the lessee when the lease terminated, the only cases in which
realization has played a prominent part have been the later stock
dividend cases. After the Supreme Court held in Eisner v. Macom-
ber that a stock dividend in the form of common on common was
not taxable as income, Congress amended the statute in 1921 to
provide explicitly that stock dividends should not be subject to
the income tax. The Treasury construed the exemption to embrace
all stock dividends, not merely the common on common dividend
involved in Eisner v. Macomber. At the same time the Regulations
provided that a stockholder might realize income from the sale
of a stock dividend or his original stock, and that in determining
such gain he should take as his basis for the dividend and the
original stock the cost of the original stock allocated between the
dividend and the original stock according to their respective market
values. This seemed a satisfactory solution of the stock dividend
problem until the Supreme Court suddenly discovered a distinction
between income stock dividends and non-income stock dividends.
In Koshland v. Helvering,18 the taxpayer owned preferred stock.
She received a dividend in common stock upon her preferred stock,
which was then redeemed by the corporation. The Commissioner
contended that the taxpayer had to allocate part of the basis of
her original preferred stock to the common stock dividend in
computing her gain from the redemption of the preferred stock.
But the Supreme Court held that this was not required. The
Court said that the stock dividend was essentially income, although
exempt from tax under the statute, and the statute did not provide
for allocating part of the basis of the original stock to an income
dividend. After this decision Congress amended the statute in
1936 to provide that stock dividends should be taxed to the extent
that they were constitutionally taxable, and another chapter started
in the history of the tax on stock dividends, in which the principal
theme was the distinction between taxable and non-taxable stock
dividends.
In Helvering v. Grifflts,109 the first case to reach the Supreme
Court under the 1936 tax on stock dividends, the government
sought to tax a dividend of common on common, contending that
Eisner v. Macomber was wrong, and that, as far as the Constitution
was concerned, all stock dividends were taxable as income. The
Supreme Court did not deny this directly. In fact it conceded it
tacitly, although it held that the particular dividend in the Grifitrs
case was not taxable. The Court said that when Congress provided
108 293 U.S. 441 (1936).
-0O 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
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that stock dividends were not taxable to the extent that they were
not constitutionally taxable it had Eisner v. Macomber in mind,
and intended to incorporate the rule of Eisner v. Macomber into
the statute. The rule that Congress intended to enact was that
stock dividends should not be taxed as income unless they gave
the stockholder a new proportional interest in the corporation.110
In other words, the Court implied that any stock dividend could
constitutionally be taxed as income; but, because Congress intended
to incorporate the rule of Eisner v. Macomber into the statute, it
held that an Eisner v. Macomber stock dividend was not taxable
under the statute, as a matter of construction rather than con-
stitutionality. The 1954 Code took a new approach to the taxation
of stock dividends and provided that stock dividends, with several
minor exceptions, should not be taxed under the income tax. 11 The
exemption of stock dividends from the income tax does not, of
course, present any constitutional problem, since even in the most
prosperous days of Eisner v. Macomber no one ever thought that
the doctrine of realization worked in reverse to require Congress
to tax realized gain as income. Under Eisner v. Macomber, Con-
gress could not tax a gain until it was realized. However, there
is no constitutional prohibition against Congress refusing to recog-
nize and tax a realized gain, if it does not see fit to do so.
Although it appears that as a constitutional prerequisite
realization is no longer required, it is, of course, possible that the
Supreme Court, which has never explicitly repudiated Eisner v.
Macomber, may revive the requirement of realization as an indis-
pensible ingredient of income in the constitutional sense. If this
happens, the four most likely situations where it might occur seem
to be: the taxation of undistributed corporate profits to stock-
holders; the taxation of gratuitous dispositions; the taxation of
paper profits; and the taxation of imputed income. It is interest-
ing to speculate briefly about the possible influence of realization
in these areas.
Despite the fact that Eisner v. Macomber explicitly rejected
Collector v. Hubbard,12 which had upheld the constitutionality of
taxing stockholders directly upon their pro rata shares of the
undistributed profits of the corporation under the Civil War income
tax acts, there are several provisions under the federal income
110 For the subsequent application of this rule see Helvering v. Sprouse and
Strassburger v. Commissioner, 318 U.S. 604 (1943) ; Chamberlain v. Commissioner,
207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953); Wiegand v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 479 (3d Cir.
1952).
111 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 305.
112 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870).
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tax which tax stockholders upon indistributed corporate profits.
The statutory provisions taxing the undistributed income of a sub-
chapter S corporation directly to the stockholders of the corpora-
tion 113 do not appear to present any constitutional difficulties in
view of the stockholder election required to invoke the tax. The
provisions for taxing the undistributed income of foreign personal
holding companies to United States shareholders 114 lack the vol-
untary aspect of the tax on subchapter S corporations, but as a
reasonable method of preventing tax avoidance it seems fairly
certain that their constitutionality will be upheld in the face of
any quibbles about realization. The same idea appears to apply
to the provisions taxing the income of United States shareholders
upon the undistributed income of controlled foreign corporations. 15
It is hardly conceivable that reasonable methods of preventing
tax avoidance such as these will be invalidated under any consti-
tutional doctrine of realization.
Ever since the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Horst 116
(wherein a father gave his son unmatured bond coupons without
parting with the bonds to which the coupons had been attached
and was taxed upon the interest represented by the coupons) inti-
mated that income might be realized from a gift of a right to
income, there has been a good deal of ,talk about the possibility of
realizing income from a gratuitous disposition. Actually the prob-
lem here does not seem to be one of realization but of gain. When
the taxpayer disposes irrevocably of a right to income or appre-
ciated property, he has completed the transaction by which income
would be earned if there were any, and thus realizes income
in the sense in which the Supreme Court used that term in Helver-
ing v. Bruun117 The real question is whether the taxpayer has a
sufficient gain to justify taxing him under the income tax. Realiza-
tion appears to be used in connection with cases of this kind in
the loose sense of an indication of the presence of taxable income,
rather than the stricter sense of completion of a transaction or a
definitive change in the taxpayer's economic status.
The difficulty in finding taxable income where a taxpayer dis-
poses of property gratuitously lies in discovering any gain or
income, since the disposition appears to involve outgo rather than
income. In this connection it is important to distinguish several
situations. There are a number of cases under the statute where
113 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1371-1377.
114 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 551-558.
115 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 951-964.
116 Supra note 103.
117 Supra note 101.
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a taxpayer is taxed upon income when he disposes of property
gratuitously, not because of any gain accruing to him as the result
of the disposition, but because of some anterior transaction which
resulted in an income tax advantage that he is now called upon to
account for. There is no question about the propriety of the
imposition of the income tax in these situations. For example, the
statute requires a taxpayer who has made an installment sale and
elected to report the gain from the sale under the installment
method to report as taxable income, when he gives away the in-
stallment obligations, the excess of the fair market value of the
obligations given away over their basis.11 Obviously, the justifica-
tion for the tax here is not any gain which the taxpayer makes from
the gift of the installment obligations, but the original gain which
he realized when he made the installment sale, upon which the
postponement of the tax is no longer allowed. The same situation
exists in connection with the income which is taxed when an em-
ployee gives away a stock option,119 or a person who has inherited
income in respect of a decedent gives away the right to such
income. 12 In all of these cases the gain which is taxed is not any
gain from the gift, but the gain from some earlier transaction
whose taxation was postponed until the taxpayer made the gift. A
somewhat similar situation occurs where a tax is imposed in con-
nection with a gratuitous disposition of property because the
disposition requires a readjustment of some deduction or credit
previously allowed the taxpayer. For example, when a liquidating
corporation distributes certain kinds of property in connection with
which it deducted post-1961 depreciation it is required to include
the amount of the depreciation as ordinary income to compensate
for the deduction previously taken.121 When a taxpayer has taken
against his tax an investment credit based upon an estimated
life for the asset in connection with which the credit is claimed and
subsequently gives the asset away before the expiration of its esti-
mated life, he is required to recompute the credit and add the part
to which he was not entitled to his tax for the year in which he dis-
posed of the property.122 It seems clear that it is permissible to
impose an income tax when property is given away to compensate
for some tax advantage the taxpayer previously obtained. The tax
118 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 453(d) (1).
119 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 421(b), (d) (4) (A) (restricted stock options).
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.421-6(d) (4), (5) (other options).
120 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(a) (2).
121 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1245(a) (1) (B) (ii).
122 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 47(a) (1). The same rule applies to changes in the
character of the property without any disposition. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 47(a) (2).
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advantage represents a sufficient gain to sustain an income tax.
Thus, for example, when property which has appreciated in value
is given to charity the taxpayer is allowed to deduct the fair market
value of the appreciated property,12 3 so that he gets the benefit of
the unrealized appreciation without being required to include it in
his gross income. It would appear to be fully constitutional, how-
ever, to limit the taxpayer to a deduction equal to the basis of
the property 24 or to achieve the same result by the technique of
requiring the taxpayer to include the appreciation in his gross
income. The cases which refused to sanction this result involved
construction, not constitutionality.
25
Where a taxpayer gives away a right to income or property
that has appreciated in value and the only advantage he obtains
from the gift is the possibility of escaping a tax on the right to
income or the appreciation in the value of the property, it is not
clear whether he may be subjected to an income tax. Of course, if
he gives away a right to income without parting with the principal
which produced the income, he will be taxed upon the income
represented by the right, when it is collected, upon the theory that
he has not divested himself effectively of the right to income for
tax purposes." 6 Even if he gives away the principal which pro-
duces the income, he will be taxed upon any income given away
which had accrued 127 or become due and payable before the gift,128
on the theory that he actually realized this income before he gave
it away. In Helvering v. Hlorst,'29 a father gave bond coupons before
they matured to his son and it was held that the donor was taxa-
ble upon the interest from the coupons, apparently when they
were collected by the donee. Mr. Justice Stone said that the father
realized income when he gave away the bond coupons because he
123 Rev. Rul. 59-196, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 56.
124 The existing law requires the amount of a charitable contribution deduction
to be reduced by any prepaid interest and certain depreciation in connection with
section 1245 and section 1250 property. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 170(b) (4), (e).
125 Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F,2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954) and White v. Brodrick,
104 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1952) refused to follow I.T. 3910, 1948-1 Cune. Bull. 15,
where the Service ruled that a taxpayer realized income when he contributed wheat
that he had raised to charity. Subsequently, I.T. 3910 was revoked. Rev. Rul. 55-138,
1955-1 Cum. Bull. 223.
126 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
127 Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 292 F2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 967 (1962) ; Austin v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Anthony's
Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946). Cf., however, Bishop v.
Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. Timken's Estate, 141
F2d 625 (6th Cir. 1944).
128 Rev. Rul. 58-275, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 22.
129 Supra note 103.
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used the right to income to obtain the satisfaction of making a gift.
It is easier to reconcile the result of the case with the doctrine
that income remains taxable to the assignor when he assigns
a right to income from property without transferring the property
which produces the income, than it is with Mr. Justice Stone's
theory that income is realized from a gift of a right to income
because of the emotional satisfaction derived from making a gift.
Stone analogized the situation to a case where a bondholder rea-
lizes income from bond coupons that he uses to buy groceries or
pay a debt. The analogy is not perfect since in these cases the
income which the bondholder realizes consists of the groceries he
receives or the liability which he discharges. When a bondholder
gives away bond coupons, he does not receive anything in return
apart from the emotional satisfaction of making a gift. Mr. Justice
Stone conceded that the father would not have realized income in
Helvering v. Horst if he had given away the bonds as well as the
coupons. This concession is easier to reconcile with the theory that
Helvering v. Horst is an assignment case rather than a "realization"
case. From the viewpoint of liability for the income tax on assigned
income, if the taxpayer in Helvering v. Horst had given away the
bonds as well as the coupons, he would no longer have been taxable
upon the income from the bonds, and this income would have been
taxed to the donee or assignee. If, however, he experiences a tax-
able satisfaction when he gives away a right to income, it is diffi-
cult to see why this satisfaction should not be treated as income
when it is accompanied by a gift of the bonds. It is generally
assumed that the taxpayer in Helverirg v. Horst realized income
from the bond coupons when they were collected by his son. 30
If this assumption is sound, it would appear that the case is an
assignment case where the income collected by the son remained
taxable to the father. If the father realized income when he gave
away the coupons, he should have realized this income at the time
of the gift. Certainly, if he had used the coupons to buy groceries,
he would have realized income when he purchased the groceries,
rather than when the grocer cashed in the coupons.
The difficulty in finding taxable income when a man gives
away a right to income does not appear to lie in realization,
because there is a final disposition of the right to income, which
would justify imposing a tax at that time, if there were a sufficient
gain to sustain the tax. The real difficulty seems .to be finding a
sufficient gain to justify the imposition of an income tax. Of course,
a right to income, or an appreciation in the value of property, rep-
13o See Austin v. Commissioner, supra note 127.
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resents at least a potential gain, and perhaps this is a sufficient
basis for the tax. This appears more vividly in the case of some-
thing tangible like agricultural commodities than it does in the
case of a bond coupon. Suppose, for example, that a wheat farmer
raises a wheat crop and gives the crop to his son. One could argue
that the father had a gain when he raised the crop, and Congress
has power to tax the gain when he gives it away if it sees fit.
Whether one says that a right to income or an appreciation in the
value of property represents a gain or a potential gain, it probably
is a sufficient basis for the imposition of an income tax as far as
the constitutionality of the tax is concerned."3 It is doubtful if
the present statute could be fairly construed to treat a gift of appre-
ciated property or a right to income as a realization of income. 32
If, however, the statute provided explicitly for a tax in this situa-
tion, there seems to be sufficient basis for the tax to uphold Con-
gress' decision to impose a tax and to treat it as constitutional.
Otherwise the Court would fall back into the error it made in
Eisner v. Macomber, when it held that the final judgment of
what kind of gains may be taxed under the income tax rests with
the courts rather than Congress.
It has been suggested that one solution for the problem of
taxing capital gains which are earned over a number of years and
realized in a single taxable period would be to require the taxpayer
to inventory his assets at the beginning and the end of the taxable
year and pay a tax on any net increase, with presumably the
privilege of deducting any net decrease, in the value of his assets.
This presents the question of realization because there has been
no completed transaction, as well as the question of whether a
potential gain is sufficient gain to sustain an income tax. The
administrative difficulties in connection with such a plan are so
great that it is unlikely that Congress will ever adopt it. If Congress
did, the Supreme Court might sustain its constitutionality out of
deference to the legislative judgment as to the appropriate time
to impose an income tax. To a limited extent, of course, unrealized
appreciation in the inventory value of goods is taxed under the
current code where goods are inventoried on the basis of market
values and used to determine the cost of goods sold. No one seems
disturbed about the constitutionality of this practice.
The administrative problems connected with taxing a man
131 However, although the Service ruled that a taxpayer realized income when
he gave calves produced by his cows to his son (I.T. 3932, 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 7), the
courts refused to follow this ruling. Campbell v. Prothro, supra note 125; Elsie
Sorelle, 22 T.C. 459 (1954) ; Estate of Farrier, 15 T.C. 277 (1950).
132 See note 131 supra.
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upon the use of his own property as income are obvious. The diffi-
culty here does not rest on realization, because it would seem that
a tax upon the use of property is an indirect tax, which can be
imposed without apportionment, 33 regardless of whether the sub-
ject of the tax is income in the constitutional sense or not. There
are, moreover, obvious inequities in omitting imputed income from
the income tax, which could be urged in favor of the constitution-
ality of such a tax.134
Conclusion
It is possible that we have made a mistake in seeking to define
taxable income in terms of some economic objectivity instead of
treating it as a juridical concept resting upon considerations of
policy. When a court decides that taxable income exists in a
specific case it goes through the same process as it does when it
decides a tort or contract case. In the tort or contract case, the
question facing a court is whether it is just and socially expedient
to subject the defendant to a liability for tort or breach of contract.
In a tax case the question confronting the court is whether it is
just and proper to subject the taxpayer to liability for an income
tax. Perhaps a fitting approach to taxable income is to think of it
as an occasion on which it is just and socially sensible to impose
liability for an income tax, rather than as some particular kind of
economic entity. From this point of view the constitutionality of
taxing a particular item as income resolves itself into an inquiry
into whether Congress has acted reasonably in imposing the tax.
The question of construing the word "income" in a tax statute to
include a particular gain becomes a question of whether or not such
a construction will achieve a just and socially desirable result.
'33 Supra notes 99 and 100.
134 For example, if two taxpayers each have $25,000 and one invests this sum
in a personal residence, while the other invests in stocks and uses the dividends from
the stocks to rent a residence, the first taxpayer will not have any taxable income,
while the second taxpayer will be required to report the dividends from the stocks
as income and will not, of course, be entitled to deduct the rent of the residence,
since this is a personal expense.
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